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Abstract 
This paper describes the operational mechanism used by informal groups in The Gambia 
called~. The evolution of kafos and the functions performed by indigenous and NGO kafos 
in pen-urban areas are described. The quality of services provided by indigenous and NGO kafos 
is discussed to derive implications for NGO involvement in kafos. The paper concludes that 
NGOs should be cautious when they offer fmancial services through the kafos by not underpricing 
their loans to the detriment of indigenous kafos. 
GROUP BASED INSURANCE AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION: 
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Subsaharan African (SSA) countries report a variety of indigenous self-help groups at the 
village level (Bouman, 1994).1 In The Gambia such groups are called~. 2 They are voluntarily 
formed groups that provide insurance, fmancial intermediation, labor exchange, and non-
commercial social and political services within the community. These kafos are important 
informal mechanisms that indigenously substitute for missing markets for finance, insurance and 
labor in rural and peri-urban villages. Kafos are usually homogenous in terms of member age, 
ethnicity, gender and occupation but have various membership sizes (Shipton, 1992). They are 
frequently found in rural and peri-urban areas, especially among farming communities. 
With the implementation of the Economic Reform Program (ERP) that liberalized the 
economy beginning in 1985, economic activities and incomes in urban Banjul have grown 
resulting in increased demand for a wide variety of services includiP: r1nancial intermedianon. 
With a limited formal banking system and inadequate government sup; orr for income: generating 
activities, NGOs have become active in providing fmancial services and technical assistance 
throughout the country. Since the targeting of groups rather than individuals is presumed to 
reduce borrower screening and monitoring costs for fmancial intermediaries and since groups may 
be an efficient way to disseminate information about technology, NGOs have begun to organize 
kafo-like groups or use existing indigenous kafos as conduits to channel their financial and 
technical assistance services. The NGO kafos are designed by external donors who usually do not 
reside in the area or participate in kafo activities. While some NGOs use external funds to 
provide subsidized loans to targeted members of the kafos, others simply extend technical 
assistance. The indigenous kafos, on the other hand, are custom designed to meet their member 
needs and utilize internally mobilized resources. Therefore, NGO formed kafos with their diverse 
institutional designs are expected to have an externality effect on the indigenous village kafos. 
It is important to understand the operational mechanism of indigenous institutions such as 
kafos in order to anticipate some of the consequences of introducing new institutions to resolve 
economic and social problems. Although several studies have documented the existence of kafos 
in the rural Gambia (Carney, 1988; Shipton, 1992; Nagarajan, Meyer and Ouattara, 1994), there 
are no detailed studies of peri-urban kafos: their composition, functions, terms and conditions for 
the provision of various services and spillover effects due to interactions with NGOs. This paper 
represents the frrst step in filling this vacuum. First, the evolution of kafos is documented and 
the functions performed by indigenous and NGO kafos are described. Second, the types and 
quality of services provided by indigenous and NGO kafos are discussed to derive implications 
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for NGO involvement in kafos. Data on 23 peri-urban kafos, 19 indigenous and four formed by 
NGOs, are used for the analysis. 
2. Evolution of Kafos 
It 1s unportant to ttace the evolution of kafos in order to place the current peri-urban kafos 
in some perspective. Kafos began as simple age-based self-help groups. They have now evolved 
into more complex social and econorrnc institutions in rural and peri-urban areas. This evolution 
has been influenced by several micro level processes that shape their formation, and macro level 
processes that facilitate their evolution as economic institutions. The emergence of these more 
complex kafos can, therefore, be explained through variations m these micro and macro processes. 
It is not exactly clear when kafos originated in the Gambia. It can be postulated, however, 
that they were formed in the early sixteenth century in areas currently called The Gambia when 
the majority of the tribes found there migrated from Mali. The presence of indigenous village 
groups similar to kafos called demisenu tons are documented in Mali as early as the late fifteenth 
century (Hopkins, 1971). The term kafo historically referred to groups of individuals that belong 
to particular age groups within a ward or a village. Kafos composed of individuals aged above 
forty five years functioned as an elite council that formulated rules for the community, while kafos 
of individuals between the ages of twenty to forty five were often responsible for providing labor 
services. The kafos were primarily involved in implementing self-help public works projects such 
as village cleaning, weU digging, house building and, to a lesser extent, the cultivation of crops 
for households with insufficient family labor. The kafos that provided labor services to individual 
farmers were compensated with food and drinks (Hopkins, 1971). Providing labor to the kafo was 
mandatory and a failure to do so was punishable by fme or by threat of physical force. Kafo 
members also participated in organizing social and political activities within the village (Weil, 
1971). 
With the shift from subsistence to more commercialized agriculture through the 
introduction of cash crops such as groundnuts that require a large and constant flow of labor, and 
with the lack of organized labor markets, kafos began to also function as labor rotation or 
exchange groups. In these kafos, members rotated labor among their plots and hired out labor 
to adjacent families with insufficient labor. At this point the criteria for membership expanded 
to include both age (working age adults) and occupation. Kafos functioned as convenient 
mechanisms to organize labor on a mutual help basis and also increased the bargaining power of 
hired labor, especially in rice growing areas (Carney, 1988). 
It is difficult to chronologically identify the period when these labor rotation groups also 
began to undertake insurance and financial services such as rotating and non-rotating savings and 
credit programs. Nevertheless, it can be viewed as a logical response to the commercialization 
of agriculture. The shift to commercial crops had three effects on village household economies: 
(i) it reduced the food crop area that provided food security to farm households; (ii) it increased 
the household's cash flow through the sale of cash crops; and (iii) it led to the formation of 
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commercialized labor groups that were no longer willmg to provide free labor services. While 
the commercial crops often produced high yields, they were also prone to exogenous shocks that 
led to high yield variance. But formal insurance markets did not exist to insure against 
idiosyncratic risks and to provide Iui.:-..J security by consumption smoothing. Furthermore, there 
were few formal financial means to mobilize the savings that accrued from commercial farming 
or to provide emergency credit to cover individual contingencies. Kafos began to incur1-'·Jrate, 
therefore, the functions of insurance and financial markets besides their more traditional functions. 
The more modern kafos, while maintaining some of their historical characteristics, have 
evolved into multifunctional informal groups with multiple criteria in addition to age for member 
eligibility. In addition to these indigenous kafos, NGOs have begun to org_r.JZe kafo-like groups 
to channel fmancial services and technical assistance tc ::- · ,,~ and peri-urban villages. In fact, the 
term kafo has now become a generic term to represent the maJOrity r-r g:ronp activ 1uc::. undertaken 
in a village. Therefore, we refer to kafos organized by NGOs as NGu A.afos to distinguish them 
from indigenous kafos that do not have direct NGO involvement. 
Several authors have documented indigenous kafos as versatile and complex village level 
institutions in The Gambia (Carney, 1988; Shipton, 1992). While the kafos are well established 
institutions, several variations have been observed in termc; of their functicns a~ a. result of the 
specific microenviromnent u: a given village The Li::;, ~ ... ;hr~ :·.me of the variatiOns 
in kafo functions that have emerged. Differences in their level of NGO involvement are noted as 
one explanation for their evolutionary path. 
3. Description of the Data 
Six villages located in peri-urban Gambia were selected tor tlus study. These villages were 
within a radius of 20 km from Banjul, the capital city. A total of 62 kafos were identified in the 
sampled villages. Since this paper highlights the insurance and financial services provided by 
kafos, 23 kafos qualified as the sample for the study. The kafo leaders were interviewed during 
February-March 1993 using structured questionnaires to collect current and retrospective data on 
the origin of the kafo, membership size and composition. functions ;:--~rformed, terms and 
conditions associated with these functions, contract enforcement techniques, and type of NGO 
involvement in kafo activities. The kafo leaders were often accompanied during the interviews 
by their committee members and important kafo members. This helped to cross check the data 
and ensure high quality responses. Furthermore, additional informal interviews were conducted 
with village leaders and elders. 
a. General perspective on kafos and kafo leaders 
A total of 19 indigenous and four NGO kafos provided insurance and fmancial 
intermediation services in the study area. On average, the indigenous kafos were 9.1 years old, 
while NGO kafos were 2.9 years old. Whereas nine of the 23 kafos sampled were comprised of 
women only and three were comprised of men only, 11 were mixed gender. Villages tended to 
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be served by more mixed and pure female compared to pure male kafos. The villages were, in 
general, served by more than one kafo providing insurance and fmancial services. 
The 23 kafos were headed by 19 different leaders of which nine were men and ten were 
women. Each respondent tended to head more than one kafo. While the gender of the leader of 
the kafo was determined by the majority gender of the members, men were often preferred as 
heads in mixed and even in some pure female kafos to avoid conflicts among women members 3 . 
In mixed gender kafos, members of the management committee were comprised of both 
genders, while they were comprised of men (women) in pure men (women) kafos. The committee 
was chosen democratically. Whereas the activities and rules for the provision of kafo services 
were decided by the members in indigenous kafos, in NGO kafos the governing rules were 
suggested by external donors who neither reside nor participate in the kafo activities as members. 
Of course, the final decision to accept NGO suggestions on kafo activities and associated 
operational rules is made by kafo members. In the majority of cases, however, the kafos accept 
the NGO suggestions for fear of losing external support. In fact, several indigenous kafos 
reported that in order to secure funding they were willing to associate with NGOs and restructure 
their activities according to their suggestions. Several creative responses to the enthusiasm by the 
NGOs for using indigenous kafos as their conduits were observed in the sample. They include 
making video tapes of their activities to show the NGO representatives and creating a separate 
kafo fund to contact NGOs and entertain them 4 • 
b. Membership size, composition and membership criteria 
The membership size, composition and criteria for kafo membership are presented in table 
1. The kafos, on average, had more than 100 members, 81 women and 27 men, representing 70 
percent of the adult population in the village 5 . Kafo leaders reported that roughly 85 percent of 
their members reported farming as their primary economic activity reflecting the agricultural 
nature of the peri-urban area. The higher participation by female members in NGO compared to 
indigenous kafos is explained by the NGOs' emphasis on organizing kafos for women. 
On average, the age of kafo members ranged from just under 20 to about 77 years. 
However, members in NGO kafos were younger compared to indigenous kafos indicating a 
greater relative participation of a more economically active population. Indigenous kafos, on the 
other hand, included older and more marginal populations and, as a consequence, were organized 
to provide insurance (contingency loans) services to this group. 
Membership in multiple kafos was common with members on average participating in two 
kafos. In general, the members of NGO kafos participated in more kafos than did the members 
of indigenous kafos. Several of the members of NGO kafos maintained their membership in both 
indigenous and NGO kafos to realize a broader range of services than could be gained in either 
kafo separately. 
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Multiple criteria were used to recruit kafo members. The survey revealed that the criteria 
included, in order of priority, geographic proximity, gender, occupation, age, ethnicity and 
marital status 6• It is interesting to note that while geographic proximity was an important criteria 
to screen members in indigenous kafos, occupatio~ ... _gender predmninatee1 m NGO kafos. This 
underscores the preference of NGOs for economically active women compared to the indigenous 
kafos. 
c. Kafo functions 
Kafos performed several types of functions including the provision of insurance, financial 
intermediation, labor, social and political services. No significant differences were found in the 
terms and conditions for the several services offered, except for fmancial services, by NGO and 
indigenous kafos. However, the type of services wac; different. The following section frrst 
describes the terms and conditions of kafo functions and this is followed by a comparison of the 
number and types of functions provided by NGO and indigenous kafos, respectively. The 
functions performed by kafos can be classified as follows: 
Insurance: Twelve indigenous kafos reported performing insuran-:t. ::'unctions. An average 
of 4.3 hectares was collectively cultivated, primarily in the rainy seasor.. h\ the memoers. The 
crops grown included coarse grains, vegetables, groundnuts and ses .... h... Some kafos also 
operated machinery such as a coarse grain milling machine. The proceeds from these economic 
actions were contributed towards a common kafo fund primarily used to mitigate village level 
contingencies and, to a lesser extent, member contingencies. Member contingencies included 
medical expenses, funerals and frre accidents. An average of D 1 , 724 was reported as the size 
of these common kafo funds 7• An average of four members were reported to have received loans 
ranging from D 32- 80 at an interest rate of 4.8 percent for an average term of four months 8 
(table 2). Due to the small amount of common kafo funds that can be allocated to loans. kafos 
reported resorting to loan size rather than loan quantity rationing 9• Some of the large kafos 
allocated part of their funds to village level contingencies and divided the rest among themselves 
instead of supplying loans to members. 10 
Common economic activity: Conducting a common economic activity was observed to 
occur more frequently among NGO than indigenous kafos. These activities involved the members 
collectively undertaking vegetable gardening, soap making or ram fattening. The NGOs provide 
the vegetable garden plots, fencing materials and assistance for digging wells for NGO kafos. In 
the indigenous kafos, however, the land was allotted by the village leader, and the members 
voluntarily fenced and dug wells. In both the indigenous and NGO kafos, the members 
collectively owned the land, fence and wells but they were allotted individual plots and were given 
the autonomy to determine cropping schemes and marketing outlets. The sJ.t-... .> proceeds, 
therefore, accrued to the individual members. Some kafos insisted that the members contribute 
a small fixed amount to maintain the garden. 
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In soap making and ram fattening kafos, members pooled their financial and labor 
resources to purchase inputs and jointly conducted the activity. The sales proceeds were divided 
equally among members. These common economic activities helped the members realize some 
economies of scale in resource use that would have been impossible for individual production. 
Financial intermediation: Nine indigenous and two NGO kafos reported performing 
financial intermediation in which the members undertook savings and lending activities on an 
organized basis. On average, the savings were mobilized every two months through a regular 
contribution of D six and two per member to the kafo savings fund that roughly amounted to D 
3,365 and D 1,350 per year in the indigenous and NGO kafos, respectively. The NGO kafos 
generally depended on the NGOs to provide funds for their loan activities. This common fund 
was usually nonrotating in nature. One NGO and two indigenous kafos deposited their funds in 
commercial banks but the rest maintained them with their treasurer. While this savings fund was 
used to primarily provide contingency loans to members and to build village infrastructure in 
indigenous kafos, it was used to make production loans to members in NGO kafos. Some 
indigenous kafos simply divided the fund among members at the end of a specified time (ex. 
Ramadan feast). Average loan size per member in indigenous kafos was higher (D 84) compared 
to NGO kafos (D 45). These loans were made at a group determined interest rate of 12.5 percent 
and 6.0 percent in indigenous kafos and NGO kafos, respectively, for a period of three months. 
There were two indigenous (11 percent of the sample)and two NGO kafos (50 percent of the 
sample) that charged less than one percent for a period of three months. Penalties for non-
repayment of loans in indigenous kafos included social sanctions against the family of the 
borrower, while in NGO kafos the defaulter lost future borrowing privileges. The loan recovery 
rate in indigenous kafos was 68 percent, despite the large number of contingency loans, compared 
to NGO kafos that reported 62 percent. The NGO kafos generally made production loans that are 
expected to generate profits (table 3). 
Rotating savings and credit associations (RoSCAs) called osusus are increasingly found 
within kafos. There was no marked difference in the operation of osusus between indigenous and 
NGO kafos. Eight indigenous and two NGO kafos reported the presence of osusus within their 
kafos. An average of 3.2 osusus operated within a kafo because osusu membership is limited to 
small groups of about 31 members. The majority of osusus were comprised of female members. 
On average, about 30 members contributed D 8 each to the common pot. This pot (average size 
of D 181) was allocated every 12 days to one member. The allocation was based on some 
previously agreed criterion such as order of member recruitment into the osusu or member request 
or lottery. The pots were reported to be used prllnarily to meet consumption needs such as buying 
food, clothes and paying schoo1 fees, and secondarily to buy inputs for farming and trading 
activities. Osusus generally functioned in dry seasons and ceased to exist or slowed down during 
rainy seasons when the farming activities were scarce. This indicates that stable income flows are 
required for the functioning of osusus (table 4). 
Labor: Some kafos engaged in labor exchange primarily during periods of peak demand. 
The labor rotated among member farms to take advantage of seasonal variations and water 
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availability on specific plots. Some kafos also sold their labor to non-kafo villagers and the 
proceeds were usually divided among the participants. 
Social and political: Although some kafos continuously engaged in 60Cia1 and polit1cal 
functions, the relative importance varied over a given period. The members organized social 
activities (ex. soccer club, R.:-:-ladan festivals, dance an':' singing groups to entertain NGOs and 
tourists) or political rallies. While they collecte..l · .· Jtions (one-time or period._ from their 
members to cover costs, these funds were not used. to perform regular insurance or financial 
intermediation functions. 
The data in table 5 summarizes the functions performed by the indigenous and NGO kafos 
at the time of their origin and as of Feb-April 1993. Each kafo provided mor~· ~han two services. 
While the indigenous kafos were active in providing insurance, financial intermediation and social 
and political services, the NGO kafos primarily performed common economic activities. 
Furthermore, while the indigenous kafos increased their total number of services from 41 to 47 
over the period, the NGO kafos showed no change. This is due to two reasons: (i) the NGO kafos 
were primarily formed to perform economic activities; and (ii) the NGO kafo members maintained 
their membership in indigenous kafos which allowed them w ;eceive the services not provided by 
the NGO kafos. It is interesting to note that the increase in functions performed by indigenous 
kafos has been primarily due to an increase in RoSCAs within these kafos. RoS•._., Me becoming 
an important informal savings and credit mechanism among fa~ning communities in the peri-urban 
areas. Since RoSCA membership requires a fairly regular income flow to facilitate regular 
savings, their emergence may be due to the active trading businesses undertaken by several 
farming households to supplement their farming incomes. 
4. The Quality of Insurance and Financial Intermediation 
The above analysis reveals that kafos are flexible village institutions that adapt to changing 
socio-economic environments. They provide a variety o. ,;:; ::ces by substituting for missing 
formal markets for insurance, finance and labor services. This section provides some insights into 
the quality of services provided by both indigenous and NGO kafos. The quality of services are 
proxied by the types of members served, types of services offered, and the costs of those services. 
a. Type of members served 
Indigenous organizations often play a role in supporting marginal members of society 
including women, orphaned children and the elderly. In the absence of insurance markets and 
government social security, villages often assume the moral responsibility of caring for such 
persons. Both the indigenous and NGO kafos served women members, but while the indigenous 
kafos included elderly village members who are not economically active, the NGO kafos restricted 
their membership to the economically active population. Thus some of the marginal village 
members are better served by indigenous than NGO kafos. 
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b. Type of services 
The indigenous kafos provide insurance and financial services which substitute for the lack 
of formal markets. These services are extended to both economically active and marginal 
populations and the benefits are usually not directly linked to the recipient's contributions but are 
available to all members. In this way, the more fortunate village members often provide a form 
of social security to the less fortunate ones. This could lead some members to free ride on others. 
However, members in indigenous kafos are disciplined through strict social norms and peer 
monitoring. Close geographic proximity and familial relationships among the village conununities 
allow peer monitoring of member behavior and ensure enforcement of discipline. Therefore, the 
incidence of free riding is reduced. 
The NGO kafos, on the other hand, are primarily limited to performing common economic 
activities that generate additional income for their members. They may help villagers diversify 
from farming into non-farming activities. This occupational diversification can have two effects 
on a household. It can facilitate an increase in income and it can reduce the risks due to 
covariance in household income thereby co-insuring other family members. Since NGOs bring 
into villages information about economic activities, they may be better prepared to identify 
suitable promising new activities than the villagers themselves. It is also possible, however, that 
the NGOs may convince villagers to enter into riskier investments resulting in a possible loss to 
village welfare in the event of failure. The losses may be unavoidable since the NGO kafos do 
not generally have insurance mechanisms. 
c. Costs of the services 
The organization and operation of kafos involves costs. Transaction and agency costs are 
especially important in the provision of insurance and fmancial services. 
Transaction costs: Transaction costs are the implicit and explicit expenses incurred by 
participants in a transaction. For example, in fmancial markets they include the costs incurred 
by borrowers, depositors, lenders, deposit mobilizers and regulators that effect fmancial 
transactions. This excludes interest payments, the cost of funds and loan losses (Adams, 1993). 
Transaction costs are generally low in both indigenous and NGO kafos since they are not 
regulated by formal agencies. Furthermore, unlike formal fmance, there are few cash costs in the 
fonn of time and money spent in traveling to access kafo services because the majority of the 
members reside in close proximity. In addition., the absence of complex and elaborate record 
keeping reduces costs. Non cash costs of membership are also low. Most members contribute 
their labor to kafo activities during their off-work hours which have negligible opportunity costs. 
Kafo members often consider their participation as time invested in strengthening social ties 
among kafo members. 
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Agency costs: Agency problems arise because of limited information that can lead to 
adverse selection of members by a kafo and moral hazard among the members. Moral hazard 
problems arise when some members attempt to free ride and not contribute their share of labor 
and/or money to build up kafo funds. This problem will have a negative impact on other kafo 
members, and eventually high agency problems as they also stop contributing. The careful 
selection of members using strict member criteria helps reduce information problems and 
homogeneity in occupation and gender increases the opportunities for peer monitoring and 
facilitates contract enforcement. Therefore, it can be expected tna: aQ:ency costs in kafos will be 
lower than in formal financial institutions. 
The magnitude of agency costs can be expected to differ between NGO and indigenous 
kafos. In the majority of villages, membership in an indigenous kafo is considered a moral 
obligation to the village society. In the NGO kafos, on the other hand, membership is ba~ed on 
the economic self-interest of the members and they are not bound by -.. ·ral obligations. 
Therefore, social norms may not be as useful as enforcement mechanism in NGO kafos so agency 
costs may increase. This is reflected in the slightly lower loan recovery rates recorded for NGO 
kafos compared to indigenous kafos in our data. 
NGOs employ diverse institutional designs for the provision of village level services 
through kafos. These designs can cause positive or negative externalities for indigenous kafos and 
thereby affect their agency costs. For example, the provision of financial services by an NGO 
kafo using external resources at a subsidized interest rate may increase agency costs for 
indigenous kafos. This may destroy local savings mobilization and tf''1~ 1: some villagers to 
become dependent on cheap external funds. Also some NGOs are relatively lax on loan recovery 
so this may instill poor recovery habits 11 . Therefore, the indigenous kafos may need to incur 
additional member screening and monitoring costs to reduce agency problems generated by the 
negative experience potentially derived from NGO kafo practices. 
5. Summary and Implications 
Kafos apparently originated in Mali several centuries ago and moved into The Gambia 
through migrant settlers. Originally, they were created as collective labor arrangements to carry 
out village labor tasks. Today, they have become informal multifunctional mutual aid societies 
that meet several villager needs. Their functiOns mclude labor sharing, common economic 
activities in production and marketing, maintaining community infrastructure, savings mobilization 
and lending, and contingent emergency insurance Cf1\ ~rage for marginal meill;.;cL.s in the village. 
By providing these services kafos fill in for missing formal markets. 
NGOs have recently become active in The Gambia and are providing services to meet 
village needs in nutrition, education, and health. They are also utilizing kafos to introduce new 
income generating activities especially for women. Although they appear to follow indigenous 
kafo practices, it is apparent that the NGO kafos are distinct in the functions they perform. This 
emerges in their membership and objectives. They are limited to the economically active 
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population which have serious self-interest in material benefits. There is little attention to the 
traditional welfare role played by indigenous kafos. 
The most recent initiative by NGO kafos has been to offer financial services. They can 
benefit villagers by bringing in additional resources from outside the village. But the presence 
of NGO kafos alongside indigenous kafos may create institutional conflicts if the NGOs offer 
loans at subsidized rates while the indigenous kafos necessarily have to charge higher rates to 
cover their deposit mobilization costs. Like Gresham's law, this cheap money could drive out 
dear money and indigenous kafos will be damaged in the process. Therefore, the many NGOs 
now flocking to provide financial services in many traditional societies must be mindful of their 
potential damaging effect on indigenous village institutions. The price at which loans are made 
and the seriousness in efforts to recover loans are two issues of great importance. Ifthe NGO 
kafos become unsustainable, however, because the donor funds dry up or loan recovery falls to 
unacceptable levels, they may disappear and leave behind damaged indigenous kafos resulting in 
a decline in village welfare. Efforts are needed to track the performance of NGO and indigenous 
kafos over time to determine if NGO interventions can be sustained and to measure the impact on 
villages of their successes and failures. 
Endnotes 
1. These village groups are called demisenu tons in Mali, tons in Senegal, and iddir in 
Ethiopia (Aredo, 1993; Dupuy, 1991). Similar indigenous village groups are also found 
under different names in other African countries including Zaire (Slover and Cuevas, 
1991) and Cameroon (Schrieder and Cuevas, 1992). 
2. Kafo is a Mandinka word that roughly corresponds to virde or compin in Pula and morom 
in W olof in The Gambia( Shipton, 1992). 
3. This conclusion is in contrast tc 1.a.ros found in rural areas where the majority gender of 
the kafo determined the gender of their kafo leader. Men were, however, asked to serve 
as committee members and to settle d1sputes among women members (Nagaraj an, Meyer 
and Graham, 1993). 
4. In rural areas, the village leaders offered the NGOs garde-r nlots to develop kafos for their 
community. Some villages, in fact, were not interesled m aevelopmg their garden kafos 
since they were aware of the NGO assistance to garden kafos in their neighboring villages. 
In addition, to attract an NGO that targets women by providing subsidized in-kind 
fertilizer credit, one of the villages combined its pure male kafo with the female kafo. 
Since the majority of the women did not require fertilizer for their food crop prodt'"t!r . 
the fertilizer was diverted to male members who ofte"· ::.~"'aulted on their loar...s (Nagarajan, 
Meyer and Graham, 1993). 
5. This is large compared to the membership size of rotating savings and credit associations 
called osusus in which the membership sizes ranged between ten to 24. The osusus are 
another type of important informal group in peri-urban areas that are active in fmancial 
intermediation (see Nagarajan, Graham and Meyer, 1994 for details). 
6. Female kafos considered marital status an important criteria ror kafo membership 
Unmarried women were usually young and were considered rnly temporary members of 
the village. 
7. One US$ = 8.2 Dalassis. 
8. The banks charged an annual interest rate of 27 percent while the annual inflation rate was 
about nine percent in 1993. 
9. Loan size rationing occurs when born~, ... s are supplied with smaller sized loans than 
demanded, while loan quantity rationing occurs when the applicants are denied credit 
altogether. 
10. This is rational behavior since the size of a group is inversely proportional to the 
familiarity and linkages among its members. Therefore, the informational and peer 
11 
12 
11. ~jllfv~ caflg~e~iititietetkiblines with an increase in group size. 
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Table l. Membership Size, Composition and Criteria in Peri-Urban Kafos 
Items Indigenous NGO Kafos Total 
Kafos 
Sample Size 19 4 23 
Ave. No. of Members 102 126 108 
Female 77 112 81 
Male 36 15 27 
Ave. Age of the Members (Years) 
Maximum 75 52 77 
Minimum 19 17 20 
Ave. No. of Kafos in which 1.8 2.5 2.0 
Members Participate 
Membership Criteria (No. of kafos 
reporting) a 
Geographic Proximity 15 3 18 
Occupation and Gender 6 4 10 
Ethnicity 2 0 2 
Age 1 1 2 
Marital Status 2 2 
a Since more than one criterion is used to decide on membership, the total may not add up 
to the sample size. 
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Table 2. Common Plot Activities: Crops Grown, Plot Size, Income, Use of Funds and 
Loan Characteristics 
Items 
No. of Kafos Reporting 
Indigenous Kafos 
NGO Kafos 
Crops Grown (by order of importance) 
Primary Season for the Activity 
Ave. Size of the Plot (Hectares) 
Ave. Net Annual Income from the Plot (Dalassis) 
Primary Uses of the Funds (no. of kafos Reporting) 
Community Infrastructure 
Contingency Credit to Members 
Inputs for Common Plot 
Divide Proceeds and Social Functions 
Ave. No. of Borrowers/Kafo/Y ear 
Maximum Loan Size to Members (Dalassis) 
Minimum Loan Size to Members (Dalassis) 
Weighted Average Interest Rate (%) C:W eight = 4 months) 
a Standard deviations are given in parentheses. 
Responses 
12 
12 
0 
Coarse Grains, 
Vegetables, Groundnut, 
Sesame 
Rainy Season (June-
October) 
4.3 (3.6)a 
1,724 (1,426) 
5 
3 
2 
2 
4 
80 (269) 
32 (103) 
4.8 (9.4) 
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Table 3. Characteristics of Non-Rotating Savings and Credit Activities 
Items 
No. of Kafos Reporting 
Ave. Contribution/member /period (Dalassis) 
Ave. Frequency of Mobilization Period 
Ave. Fund size per Year (Dalassis) 
Primary Uses of Funds (No. of kafos reporting) 
Contingency Loans to Kafo Members 
Production Loans to Members 
Divide among members/buy consumption goods 
To build village infrastructure/meet village 
contingencies 
Ave. Loan Size (Dalassis) 
Weighted Ave. Interest Rate (%) (Weight = 3 months) 
Ave. No. of Borrowers/Kafo/Year 
Loan Recovery Rate (%) 
a Standard deviations are given in parentheses. 
Indigenous 
Kafos 
9 
5.5 
(6.2) 
2 months 
3,365 
(5277) 
6 
1 
1 
1 
83.9 
(150.9) 
12.5 
(21.1) 
21 
68 
NGO Kafos 
2 
1.8 
(2.l)a 
2 months 
1,350 
(1587) 
0 
'l 
.:.. 
0 
0 
44.8 
(33.6) 
6.0 
(13.5) 
.:: 
.J 
62 
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Table 4. Characteristics of Rotating Savings and Credit Association Activities 
Items 
No. of Kafos Reporting 
Indigenous Kafos 
NGO kafos 
Primary Season for the Activity 
Ave. No. of Osusus per Kafo 
Ave. No. of Members 
Ratio of Female Members 
Frequency of Contribution (Days) 
Frequency of Allocation (Days) 
Ave. Amount of Contribution (Dalassi/member/rotation) 
Ave. Pot Size per Rotation (Dalassi) 
Pot Allocation Methods (No. of Kafos reporting) 
By Order of member recruitment 
By member request 
Lottery 
Primary Uses of Osusu funds (no. of kafos reporting) 
Consumption 
Trading and Farming 
a Standard deviations are given in parentheses. 
Responses 
12 
10 
2 
Dry Season 
(December-May) 
3.2 (2.2) a 
30.9 (24.6) 
84.2 
12.2 (18.4) 
12.4 (18.7) 
8.1 (5.1) 
181 (162) 
6 
3 
2 
9 
3 
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Table 5. Original and Current Functions Performed by Kafos 
Kafo Functions NGO Kafos Indigenous Kafos 
Original a Currentb Original a Currentb 
(Number of kafos reporting) 
Common Plot (Insurance) 0 f\ 11 12 
Common Activity c 5 5 3 3 
Non-rotating Savings and Credit 2 2 9 9 
Activities 
Rotating Savings and Credit 2 2 4 8 
Activities 
Labor 1 1 5 5 
Social and Political 1 1 9 10 
Total No. of Activities 11 11 41 47 
Total No. of Kafos 4 4 19 19 
Average No. of Activities/Kafo 2.8 2.8 2.2 2.5 
a Original refers to the activities undertaken by kafos at the time they were originally 
created. 
b Current refers to the activities undertaken by kafos at the time of survey in February 1993. 
c Refers to ram fattening, soap making, vegetable farming and operating common 
machinery. 
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